The waking call for military India,
according to the general public perception, is only when there is an official
breaking out of war. But, there is a lot more to warfare in the world we live
today. Battlefields have evolved since the days when India dug its feet in
Kargil last. They do not necessarily have to be the desert covered landscapes
or snow-capped peaks. Today’s battles are fought, many a times, in silos and
under urban or foreign settings, in lands which might, in no logical way, be
connected to a nation’s occupation there.
What are Special Operations Forces?
The reference here goes to Special
Operations (SpecOps) forces. To Quote Wikipedia on the roles played by the
SpecOps, include “Special reconnaissance/military intelligence, unconventional
warfare, and counter-terrorism actions. Special operations are sometimes
associated with unconventional warfare, counter-insurgency (operations against
insurgents), operations against guerrillas or irregular forces, low-intensity
operations, and foreign internal defence.”
Special operations are
undertaken, per se, by a country’s conventional armed forces but more often are
carried out by Special Operations Forces (SOF), which are military units that
are highly-trained in physical as well as psychological warfare and use special
equipment, weapons, and tactics. They are sometimes referred to as "elite"
forces, commandos, and special operators.
The book on SOF has been written
by the British and from the latter half of the 20th century, the
United States. The United Kingdom got the ball rolling with its Special Air
Service or the SAS, tasked with asymmetric warfare, hostage rescue and
infiltration. Taking cue from the newly addressed need by Britain, America
developed its own brand of Special warfare divisions across its armed forces
such as the US army with its Special Forces and Rangers, Navy with the US Navy
SEALs etc.
These large divisions, albeit specialized, were still symmetrically battle born. With more critical operations surfacing like Hostage rescues and hijacking of planes becoming the order of the day in the 70’s and 80’s, countries across the world realized that, their armed force needed more specialized personnel, a smaller group of individual teams in each military avenue. Each one specialized to be called in a moment’s notice to address situations that are as unconventional as can be. Such teams wouldn’t have more than 400 operators maybe. (Operative being the term used for CIA agents, Special operations personnel is addressed as operators). This gave birth to DEVGRU, of the Bin Laden operation fame, the Delta Force etc. Every country began paying attention to the sensitivity of the world of warfare they are or maybe engaged in like Germany with the GSG-9 (In the wake of the Munich Olympic attack by the PLO), Poland with the GROM, Israel with the Shayet 13 etc.
These large divisions, albeit specialized, were still symmetrically battle born. With more critical operations surfacing like Hostage rescues and hijacking of planes becoming the order of the day in the 70’s and 80’s, countries across the world realized that, their armed force needed more specialized personnel, a smaller group of individual teams in each military avenue. Each one specialized to be called in a moment’s notice to address situations that are as unconventional as can be. Such teams wouldn’t have more than 400 operators maybe. (Operative being the term used for CIA agents, Special operations personnel is addressed as operators). This gave birth to DEVGRU, of the Bin Laden operation fame, the Delta Force etc. Every country began paying attention to the sensitivity of the world of warfare they are or maybe engaged in like Germany with the GSG-9 (In the wake of the Munich Olympic attack by the PLO), Poland with the GROM, Israel with the Shayet 13 etc.
The next step of the evolution
was having a unified Task Force to address war situations, wherein SOF’s from
the army, navy and air force would synergize to execute operations to swift and
successful end. The best example of this is the Joint Special Operations
Command of the US, where in planning and deployment of Delta, DEVGRU, AFSOC etc
are unified under one command. This ensures one of the best reaction times to
needs and specialized skills of operations that are necessary to encounter any
possible warfare scenario, especially asymmetric ones. Despite its downfall, the
battle of Mogadishu as chronicled in many literary works gives a crisp and
clear reference to how important such a unified force can be.
Ground Zero: India
Indian Military boasts to be the
third strongest in terms of personnel in the world after US and China. It has a
robust border security mechanism in place along with valiant internal central
reserve police under the Ministry of Defence or Home. From what is known from
publically known operations of the SOF in India, they have mostly been success
stories that have been the result of planned actions of last resort. There is
seldom an example of immediate or proactive reaction through Special Forces
that have been the first resort, responding to situations that resulted in
casualty avoidance at the base of the situation. Most well known operations
such as Operations Bluestar, Black Thunder and Vajrashakti are haunting
examples of the same, where not just militants but also innocent civilians and
operators paid the ultimate price for operational inefficiencies.
India’s approach to Special
operations has been one of last resort, wherein, on exhaustion of local means
of mitigation, the administrative mechanism responds with sending the big guns.
An example of the same can be taken in the context of the Mumbai Terrorist
Attack of 26/11 , The MARCOS (Indian equivalent of the US Navy SEAL), couldn’t
be deployed in time, albeit when they were deployed, the quantum of operators
sent were more or less 10 percent of what the situation demanded.
The city under siege had to wait
a gruelling 24 hours before the centre could mobilize the NSG commandos from
New Delhi to initiate direct action to quell the situation. The MARCOS are some
of the finest marine commandos on the planet and have a base in the Mumbai, but
were haplessly waiting on the sidelines of affairs whilst the city was plagued
by monsters of humanity. The NSG had taken swift and controlled hold of the
operation on hitting the ground.
But it is for us to imagine, what
if the elite of this country were not just the call of last resort. What if
there could be a command that could respond to situations of requirement on the
striking of the first minute than the eleventh hour.
A case can be made saying that
the US has the set up of USSOCOM and JSOC in place, as they have more stakes
overseas that require greatest attention. In India, on the other hand, the
situation is more so internal wherein citizens live under the fear of
insurgency, hostage situations, anti-state mafia and fundamentalists brewing
concoctions of terror.
It doesn’t take a foreign
occupation to respond to such a need. Some of the most accomplished Special
Forces in the world have been wings of central police that react to national
and international situations of special nature, like the GIGN in France and
GSG-9 in Germany. We need to have to respond to the need we have been
overlooking all this while by focusing on the unification of strategic command
of Special Forces in India.
Constraints to the solution:
Politics is the first lever to this unlocking of India’s SOF
capabilities. Currently the Special Forces of the various arms of the Indian
military is deployed doing tasks that are done by the conventional military.
This typically undermines the very creation of a ‘special force’, wherein the
trained elite are not given the opportunity to do their primary job but are
stuck up doing peripheral tasks that undermine their very existence. Ideally
such forces must spend time cross training with other special forces across the
world or further training at their designated base or foreign locations to gain
further expertise in their niche trade.
Our political mechanism has been
as stubborn and unwilling as possible when it comes to commissioning technology
or even intelligence to the aid of SOF. The MOD has opted for IAS officers over
those in the military command for strategic and tactical positions in the
ministry since its initiation. This has greatly hampered troop mobility in
almost every situation that has been deemed strategic.
In the newly executed stillborn Integrated
Defence Staff(IDS) to develop synergy between the services to achieve optimum
force application. This unification attempt is as futile as the Directorate
General of Defence Planning Staff (DGDPS) which never got to running speed due
to unwillingness of civilian officers to operate in an environment that
required a constant liaison with Chief of Staff Committee (CoSC).
The seeds of cross-functional
expertise was first brought on the horizon of defense discussion after the
Kargil war by the Kargil Review Committee (KRC). The position of Chief of
Defense staff was one of the most critical recommendations by the committee.
The position would be occupied one of the current chiefs of armed forces on a
rotational basis of a two year tenure. The general would be single point of
military advise for the government and would streamline the flow of military
planning, financial requirements and cross functional coordination. The attempt
can be seen as a Macro level extension of the Chief of USSOCOM, where the
strategic command of the country is unified under one head, not necessarily a
general.
This ideal proposal was also put
on the back burner by incoming and outgoing governments, pleading unpopularity of
the sentiment it would create amongst the political elite and the furore ( to
pointless avail) of opposition parties. The cost of power, each time, triumphed
over the cost of life due to lack of willingness by the political hierarchy.
Intelligence is another area where India’s Special Forces take a
hit. There is no proper co-ordination between inter-service avenues of
intelligence available to the country. Around the globe, the primary
intelligence agencies are the point of first contact for strategic missions and
groundwork. The success story behind Operation Neptune Spear that killed Bin
Laden is a testament to the same. India’s lack of intelligence as an ally to
military readiness is one of its weakest spots over the years, be it the
inability to apprehend the LTTE supremo in the 1980’s to the Mumbai attack.
Even in the presence of intelligence in this respect, the central police and
military need to route its decision over the most tedious trees and branches of bureaucratic hierarchy in the central and state ministry.
Technology is a definite crippler
for our operators in this world of warfare. Despite our tremendous flair for
spending on defense, chronicled in every passing budget, our troops are
probably the last recipients of the funds. The conventional as well as special forces
of the country are in dire need for upgrading the equipment available to them
in order to fight their daily battles. Just training men and women to be placed
fighting on the line of fire isn’t the point. The point is to keep them there,
safe and capable to make it back, so that they can be sent again to serve. The
MARCOS and NSG are the few forces that have recently received some much needed
upgrades to their equipment and tactical hardware.
Understanding India's SOF needs:
The sooner the defense reforms
are brought on the table of the parliament with the necessary will and
rationality, the better it will be for our country to realize its potential to guard
and secure its borders and homes in ways we currently can only hypothesize (as
is the case with this piece I am writing). A strong case is made for –
A) A Unified command for
the macro-military so as to bring about expense and effort streamlining and
B) Micro-special operations
forces to counter any national or international threats with swift and near-shadow-like
execution, something that hasn’t been the case with almost every operation
needing Special operators to be called upon.
C) Operations of Special Forces
backed by the country’s premier intelligence agencies like RAW and IB in
addition to military intelligence, a requirement that has emerged due to the
predominately urbane nature of warfare as it evolves.
D) A unified SOF command could
ensure a task force level deployment and cross- training of different Special
Forces to synergize and take control of operations. A situation needing GARUD, NSG
and CRPF COBRA's requiring operating on even grounds, not sticking to their areas
comfort are not that difficult to imagine. Deployments not necessarily being
international but also domestic hostage situations, direct action against
anti-state elements like Maoists or ULFA and hijack responses.
India posses a unique motley of
opportunity and threat present in today’s world. We find the greatest abundance
of investment interest by the corporate world as well as tremendous oppression
and mutinous elements internally as well as externally that threaten the
existence of constitutional promises. This land of dichotomies is not one that
can be conventionally looked at when it comes to protecting its interests and
citizens.
References:
References:
- http://www.ipcs.org/issue-brief/military-and-defence/defence-reforms-and-national-security-managing-threats-and-challenges-to-172.html
- http://kumar-theloneranger.blogspot.in/2011/06/indian-special-forces-capabilities-and.html
- http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-10-16/news/55107350_1_capability-authority-indian-military/2
- http://theglobalobservatory.org/2012/08/flaws-in-indias-strategy-to-counter-the-maoist-insurgency/
- http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-interview-with-pc-katoch-saikat-dutta-on-indian-special-forces-part-one/20130415.htm
- http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-11-30/news/28380711_1_mumbai-attacks-marcos-taj
- http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/11/02/when-india-failed-in-the-mumbai-terrorist-attacks.html
- http://www.indiandrives.com/ussocom-awards-polaris-contracts-to-supply-all-terrain-vehicles.html
- http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsf/20120308.aspx
- http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/lead-article-civilian-supremacy-and-defence-reforms/article6538744.ece?homepage=true
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